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Nonhuman animals and sovereignty: On Zoopolis, failed states and institutional 
relationships with free-living nonhuman animals1 
 
Josh Milburn 
 
This is a draft version of a chapter in Intervention and Protest, edited by Andrew 
Woodhall and Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade, published by Vernon Press. It may 
differ slightly from the published version. For the final version of this paper, please see 
the published book. 
 
A problem for those ± academics and activists ± concerned with human relationships with 
nonhuman animals (NHAs) is the nature of our relationship with free-OLYLQJ RU ³ZLOG´
NHAs, especially given the huge levels of NHA death and suffering in nature. There are at 
OHDVWWZRZD\VZHFDQWKLQNDERXWWKLVLVVXH2QHLVDWWKHLQGLYLGXDO³PRUDO´OHYHOZHFDQ
ask questions about the relationship we should as individuals have with free-living NHAs, 
and concerning our individual response to suffering and death in nature. The other way to 
think about this is at the collective, political, institutional level. This entails asking questions 
about what kind of relationship it is appropriate for us as states and societies to have with 
free-living NHAs, and about what, if anything, the state should do about the suffering and 
death of free-living NHAs. The two are, of course, linked, as political change relies upon the 
actions of individuals. Thus, one could be an activist for free-living NHAs by helping them 
directly, or by agitating for political reform.  
My focus in this chapter will be upon the political aspect of the question. When 
thinking through the kinds of institutional relationships humans can have with free-living 
NHAs, one normative tool which is potentially useful is sovereignty. Free-living 
                                                          
1
 This chapter was written while I was reading for a doctorate in the School of Politics, International Studies and 
3KLORVRSK\3,634XHHQ¶V8QLYHUVLW\%HOIDVW7KDQNVDUHRZHGWRP\VXSHUYLVRUV'DYLG$UFKDUGDQG-HUHP\
Watkins, and my funder, the Department of Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland. Many of the 
arguments in this chapter were presented at a seminar in the PISP Research in Progress series; I thank those 
present for their comments. Finally, special thanks are owed to the editors of the present volume for their 
recommendations. 
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³FRPPXQLWLHV´ RI 1+$V LW PLJKW EH VXJJHVWHG VKRXOG EH FRQFHLYHG RI DV VRYHUHLJQ RYHU
certain territories, and this dictates (or, minimally, has a bearing on) what kinds of 
intervention and aid are appropriate. This is the view of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka 
(hereafter, D&K), whose Zoopolis (2013d) presents a normative vision of three kinds of 
recognisably political rights possessed by various kinds of NHAs, based on WKHVH 1+$V¶ 
relationship with the mixed human/NHA community. NHAs who are a part of this 
community are conceived of as citizens, giving them certain rights and responsibilities. NHAs 
who are to some level dependent upon this community without being a part of it (including 
the likes of ³IHUDO´FDWVJDUGHQELUGVDQGXUEDQIR[HV) are conceived of as denizens. Denizens 
have some but not all of the citizenship rights afforded to NHA citizens, but are not bound by 
the same responsibilities. It is the final category with which I will be primarily concerned in 
this chapter. NHAs who live free from dependency on the mixed human/NHA society 
³ZLOG´RU³free-living´1+$V) are conceived of as sovereign over their territory. On the one 
hand, this conception offers a principled reason to support the traditional animal rights 
assumption that free-living NHAs should, for the most part, be left alone (Regan 2004, p. 
363). On the other, claim D&K, it gives us guidance concerning when it is permissible, or 
even PDQGDWRU\ WR LQWHUYHQH RQ WKHVH 1+$V¶ behalf. Small-scale non-institutional 
interventions, such as saving a particular NHA with whom we have some connection, are 
acceptable as long as they are done in a way that is respectful to the sovereignty of the NHA 
³FRPPXQLW\´ DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDO ULJKWV RI 1+$V DIIHFWHG 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG ODUJH-scale 
intervention by the international community is required ZKHQWKH1+$³FRPPXQLW\´IDFHVD
challenge with which it is not equipped to successfully deal; for example, natural disasters, 
pandemics, or catastrophic levels of climate change. This is especially true when these events 
are triggered or exacerbated by human (in)action. 
I will expand no further here on precisely when this sovereignty model does or does 
not permit and/or endorse intervention, as D&K¶VRZQZRUGVRQWKHVXEMHFWLQZoopolis give 
a strong indication of this. Instead, I am interested in critically assessing the success and 
conceptual coherence of this model of sovereignty, with the aim of better understanding our 
normative obligations to free-living NHAs. Specifically, I am interested in the political 
question of institutional relationships with free-living NHAs, and especially the extent to 
which proposed institutional relationships are coherent, desirable and/or practical. To be 
clear, I share with D&K ± and the other contributors to the present volume ± a strong 
commitment to working towards a world respectful of NHAs. In order to reach this better 
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world, we need a clear and coherent understanding of what represents, or is entailed by an 
idea of, a respectful political relationship with free-living NHAs. My criticism of D&K 
should be understood in this context. To that end, I hope that this chapter can be read partially 
as a response to D&K¶VKRSH WR LQVSLUH WKHRUHWLFDOZRUNRQDOWHUQDWLYHSROLWLFDO WKHRUies of 
animal rights to their own (2013b, p. 214; 2013c, p. 772). If read in this way, the present 
enquiry should not be considered a response to Zoopolis as such, but part of a conversation 
about the best way of understanding our relationship with NHAs, and so what we as 
academics and activists can do to improve this relationship in practice. 
The chapter will progress as follows. )LUVW ,ZLOOVHWRXWZKDW,FDOOWKH³IDLOHGVWDWH
REMHFWLRQ´ (FSO) to D&K¶VSLFWXUHRI1+$VRYHUHLJQW\DQGRULWVFRQVHTXHQFHs. Second, I 
will outline their various responses to the FSO: the supposed hypocrisy in declaring NHA 
states failed while not doing the same for human states, the distinction between intra- and 
inter-species violence, and the fact that free-living NHAs do not exist in the circumstances of 
justice. I suggest that these responses are not compelling, and so conclude that the FSO 
reveals problems with D&K¶VXVHRIWKHFRQFHSWRIVRYHUHLJQW\ This, however, should not 
be understood as damning for the project of Zoopolis. Instead, we can move beyond the 
dichotomous conflict between the sovereignty model and the FSO: namely, we can critically 
think about how we should be interacting with free-living NHAs if we take it to be the case 
WKDW1+$³FRPPXQLWLHV´DUHLQVRme way analogous to failed states. In closing, I will ask the 
practical question of what institutions, if any, we should be establishing to protect free-living 
NHAs. I compare the sovereignty moGHOZLWKWKH³ULYDO´DFFRXQW of ³DQLPDOSURSHUW\WKHRU\´ 
(Hadley 2015), suggesting that these theories share a number of important premises and that 
their disagreement may be more pragmatic than substantive, before concluding that we do not 
today find ourselves in a position to satisfactorily implement either proposal. In practice, this 
means that if we wish to work towards this kind of institutional protection of NHAs, we have 
to work towards changing everyday attitudes towards NHAs, most basically by adopting 
veganism and spreading a pro-vegan message. 
 
The failed state objection 
In the course of outlining their model of NHA sovereignty, D&K consider but reject the 
possibility that the violence inherent in nature ± especially the violence inherent in 
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predator/prey relationships ± might entail that free-living NHAs lLYHLQ³IDLOHG´VWDWHV³,ID
KXPDQFRPPXQLW\IDLOHGLQWKLVUHJDUG´WKH\REVHUYH 
 
[W]HZRXOGOLNHO\YLHZLWDVDµIDLOHGVWDWH¶RU LQDQ\HYHQWRQHWKDWUHTXLUHVVRPH
degree of external intervention. But in the context of ecosystems, food cycles and 
predator-SUH\ UHODWLRQVKLSV DUH QRW LQGLFDWRUV RI µIDLOXUH¶ 5DWKHU WKH\ DUH GHILQLQJ
features of the context within which wild animal communities exist; they frame the 
challenges to which wild animals must respond both individually and collectively, and 
the evidence suggests that they respond competently. (Donaldson, Kymlicka 2013d, p. 
176) 
 
Nonetheless, those critically engaging with the position presented in Zoopolis have presented 
concerns about this issue. First, Oscar Horta (2013) and Andriano Mannino (2015) stress that 
the existence of near-universal NHA suffering, including suffering that is a result of various 
VSHFLHV¶ UHSURGXFWLYH VWUDWHJLHV PD\ EH LQGLFDWLYH RI VWDWH IDLOXUH 7KHVH DXWKRUV GUDZ
DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ ³K-VHOHFWHG´ animals, including humans, who have a 
small number of young of whom a comparatively large proportion survive into adulthood, 
DQG ³r-VHOHFWHG´ NHAs, who can have many thousands or millions of young, of which an 
average of only one or two will reach adulthood and breed. Thus, Horta writes that, given the 
nature of population dynamics, 
 
[A]nimals in nature are in a permanent state of humanitarian catastrophe. If we follow 
Zoopolis in employing political categories to illuminate animal ethics, then most 
animals in the wild are living in irretrievably failed states incapable of ever being 
WUDQVIRUPHGLQWRVRYHUHLJQFRPPXQLWLHVWKDWUHVSHFW WKHLUPHPEHUV¶ LQWHUHVWV7KHUH
is no just previous non-catastrophic state that might be desirable to restore. To avoid 
catastrophe, we need to bring about a completely new scenario. (2013, p. 119) 
 
On the other hand, I have elsewhere (2015) presented a version of the FSO stressing the 
problematic relationships between beings who, under the DXWKRUV¶ model, are equally 
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members of a particular sovereign community, or, to put it another way, are both citizens of a 
certain 1+$VWDWH,FRPSDUHGWKHH[DPSOHRIDQLVODQG³VWDWH´FRQWDLQLQJUDEELWVDQGVWRDWV
(Rabbit Isle) to a human state containing farmers and marauders (Husbandria). In both cases, 
the populations are well-EDODQFHG ³HFRORJLFDOO\´ WKH VWRDWVPDUDXGHUV KDYH Hnough 
rabbits/farmers to kill for survival, while the rabbits/farmers never die out, though most are 
eventually killed by the stoats/marauders. Drawing upon the words of D&K¶VDOUHDG\TXRWHG
pre-emptive response to the FSO, I suggested that: 
 
[T]he maraudeUVPLJKWXQGHUVWDQG WKHLU UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKH IDUPHUVDVD µGHILQLQJ
IHDWXUH¶ RI OLIH LQ WKH QDWLRQ 7KH IDUPHUV PD\ HYHQ VKUXJ WKHLU VKRXOGHUV
SKLORVRSKLFDOO\ DQG DJUHH )XUWKHUPRUH +XVEDQGULD¶V IDUPHUV VXUYLYH JHQHUDWLRQ WR
generation, even if most arHHYHQWXDOO\PXUGHUHGDQGVRµUHVSRQGFRPSHWHQWO\¶WRWKH
FRQVWDQWWKUHDWLQWKHVDPHZD\WKDWWKHUDEELWVRI5DEELW,VOHµUHVSRQGFRPSHWHQWO\¶
to stoat attacks. None of this would mean that we have no obligation to intervene in 
Husbandria, and so it is difficult to see how it could mean that we have no obligation 
in the case of Rabbit Isle. (2015, p. 280) 
 
It is important WRQRWHWKDW+RUWD¶VFSO is made in the context of an ethical framework highly 
supportive of greater intervention to aid NHAs, while mine is made in conjunction with an 
alternative (but still animal-rights-based) argument against widespread intervention in nature. 
The significance of this point will become clear later in the chapter. Others, including Per-
Anders Svärd (2013) and Marcel Wissenburg (2014), also raise variations of the FSO. 
D&K have responded to the FSO, apparently labelling Horta, Svärd and I 
³K\SRFULWLFDO´ 
 
After all, human societies engage in massive inter-species violence: we deliberately 
kill billions of animals each year for food, yet no one thinks our propensity to kill 
other species2 disqualifies us IURPFODLPLQJVRYHUHLJQW\« [Free-living NHAs] are 
not in the circumstances of justice, and are not able to survive except by harming 
others. Our killing of animals, by contrast, is voluntary, done for no reason other than 
our pleasure in eating their flesh. Under conditions of necessity, predation by one 
VSHFLHVRIDQRWKHUVSHFLHVLVDQHFHVVDU\HYLO«7RGLVTXDOLI\RUFDVIURPVRYHUHLJQW\
                                                          
2
 7KHWDONRI³VSHFLHV´KHUHLVVRPHZKDWPLVOHDGLQJZKDWLVDWVWDNHLVmembers of one species killing members 
of another. 
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because they kill other species out of necessity, while upholding human sovereignty 
even though we kill other species out of choice, involves breathtaking hypocrisy. 
(2015, p. 336HPSKDVLV'	.¶V) 
 
There appear to be three separate objections, here. First, there is the accusation of hypocrisy ± 
the oddity in declaring NHA states failed while opting not to do the same for human states. 
Second, there is the difference between intra-species violence and inter-species violence. This 
second objection is made more explicitly by Donaldson (private correspondence3), who 
ZULWHV WKDW P\ 5DEELW ,VOH+XVEDQGULD H[DPSOH FRQIXVHV ³DQ LQWHU-species example (stoats 
and rabbits), with an intra-species example (humans and humans)´. ³,W¶V WUXH´ 'RQDOGVRQ
says, ³that we would judge a human state structured on a relationship of murder and 
FDQQLEDOLVPDVDIDLOHGVWDWHEXW WKDW¶VEHFDXVHLW¶V a case of intra-human violence´. Third, 
there is the claim that NHA states are not failed, because NHAs do not exist in the 
circumstances of justice, which is closely rHODWHGWRWKHLGHDRIWKH³QHFHVVLW\´RI1+$-on-
NHA violence. I will deal with each of these responses in turn. 
 
Hypocrisy 
The accusation of hypocrisy rests upon the assumption that proponents of the FSO do not 
characterise human states as failed in the same way that they characterise NHA states as 
failed.4 There are at least two ways that the proponent of the FSO can respond to this point. 
The first is to bite the bullet and accept that human states are failed. This is not utterly 
implausible, but I will not defend it here. Instead, I think that there is a morally relevant 
difference between human states and NHA states that can justify declaring the latter, but not 
the former, failed. As Bernd Ladwig observes, the accusation of hypocrisy misses the point, 
DVLW³FRQIRXQGVKXPDQV¶PRUDOfailures ZLWKDQLPDOV¶incapability WRDFWPRUDOO\«KXPDQ
FRPPXQLWLHVDUHFDSDEOHRIPRUDOOHDUQLQJ´(2015, p. 295HPSKDVLV/DGZLJ¶V). The fact that 
a state has failed in some very important regard does not entail that it is a failed state; 
actually-existing states, in addition to (all) failing catastrophically with regard to what is 
owed to NHAs, often fail with regards to what is justly owed to women, homosexuals and so 
forth. D&K UHFRJQLVHWKLV³7KHUHDOLW\LVWKDWDOOVRFLHWLHVKXPDQRUDQLPDODUHOLNHO\WRIDLO
VRPHWHVWVRIFRPSHWHQFH´(2013a, p. 158). This does not mean that they are failed states. 
                                                          
3
 Email dated 12 June 2015; cited with permission. 
4
 Or, alternatively, the way they would characterise NHA states as failed if they accepted the broader framework 
presented in Zoopolis. 
Page 7 of 21 
 
 
Perhaps it would be useful to differentiate clearly between two separate claims: 
sometimes a state has failed to do something; other times the state is failed. The former does 
not entail the latter. Though there is a broader open question about the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for state failure which I will not here attempt to answer, I suggest that 
there is clearly some assumption of the loss of control (not merely unjust and/or illegitimate 
government) and the inability (or high unlikelihood) of regaining control in the claim that a 
state is failed. NHA states have never had this control, and are unable to seize it; the idea is 
almost meaningless. On the other hand, human states still possess this control, they simply 
fail to use it appropriately. Sovereignty is granted to human groups partially out of a respect 
for the ability of political actors to engage in moral learning ± something for which NHAs 
have no ability and in which they have no interest (Ladwig 2015, pp. 295-6) ± human states 
FDQ FRPH WR UHFRJQLVH WKH ZURQJQHVV RI WKHLU DFWLRQV ZKLOH 1+$ ³FRPPXQLWLHV´ FDQQRW
This means that there is a morally relevant difference between the human (or mixed) states 
that fail to respect or protect animal rights and the NHA states that fail to respect or protect 
animal rights; though both have failed (in this regard), it is plausible that only the latter are 
failed. 
D&K may nonetheless object to this characterisation on the grounds that I have 
arbitrarily selected one area of activity ± violence ± for determining whether or not a state is 
(not has) failed. Donaldson QRWHVWKDW³WKHUHDUHFUXFLDORWKHUPHDVXUHVVXFKDVVXVWDLQDELOLW\
and leaving enough and as good for others in which sovereign wild animal communities also 
clearly constitute much better functioning states [than] human-led ones, and no need to be 
µLPSURYHG¶E\XV´SULYDWHFRUUHVSRQGHQFH I am unconvinced that these problems are of the 
same kind as issues of inter-subject violence. Issues of violence on thinking, feeling beings 
(and, specifically and importantly, citizens and subjects of justice) are issues for which the 
state has primary responsibility, and are clearly issues within, for and about the state, and if 
the state can have no grasp on them, it has and is failed. 
 
Species 
The second response to the FSO rests on the claim that there is some moral difference 
between inter- and intra-species violence. While it is true that a focus on predation may shine 
a light primarily on inter-species violence, there are plenty of examples of horrific intra-
species violence in nature. For example, many fish practice cannibalism, including filial 
cannibalism ±
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many species, including social species: that male lions, for instance, will kill the cubs of 
others is well-known. Even if this kind of intra-species violence were not common, however, 
D&K¶VUHVSRQVHZRXOGVWLOOEHXQFRQYLQFLQJ It is not clear why it should make a difference 
whether violence is perpetrated by conspecifics or not. The authors are non-speciesists, and 
are rightly NHHQ WR PRYH DZD\ IURP WKH $ULVWRWHOLDQ ³IL[DWLRQ ZLWK VSHFLHV GLIIHUHQFH´ in 
political theory (Donaldson, Kymlicka 2015, p. 323). This move is evident in much of the 
rest of their framework. For example, companion animals are to be fed vegan diets 
(Donaldson, Kymlicka 2013d, pp. 149-53) and socialised to be respectful of other citizens 
and denizens (Donaldson, Kymlicka 2013d, pp. 123-6), regardless of the species 
categorization of the companions and their potential food sources. If species difference is 
generally unimportant, it is hard to see why it should play such an important role when it 
comes to mixed states not involving humans. 
 
 
Circumstances of justice 
The final response to the FSO is that free-living NHAs do not live in the circumstances of 
justice.5 While it is wholly plausible that beings who do not live in circumstances of justice 
have different kinds of normative obligations to one another (if they have any at all), it is 
curious to use this claim to object to categorising a state as failed. As observed by Svärd, the 
move is very much contrary to the typical historical assumptions of state theory, in which the 
state exists precisely to protect its citizens from the war of all against all (2013, p. 198). In 
particular, Svärd observes, we may have an obligation to bring about circumstances of justice 
if we can (2013, p. 198); elsewhere, D&K argue that this is indeed the case when it comes to 
problematic human actions (2013d, 48-9). It does not seem that the (surely accurate) 
REVHUYDWLRQWKDW1+$³FRPPXQLWLHV´GRQRWH[LVWLQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIMXVWLFHFKDOOHQJHV
WKHFODLPWKDWVRYHUHLJQ1+$³FRPPXQLWLHV´ZRXOGEHIDLOHGVWDWHVLWVHHPVWREHSUHFLVHO\
the evidence that the FSO needs. If a community of humans did not exist in the circumstances 
of justice,6 we would surely have good reason to say that their state ± if they had one ± both 
had and, likely, was failed. 
                                                          
5
 That is, they do not exist in a situation in which cooperation is possible and/or necessary (Rawls 1999, chap. 
22).  
6
 With the exception, perhaps, of those who do not live in the circumstances of justice because they have no 
need of justice; i.e., they are all able to get along perfectly fine without any kind of justice. 
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It seems, then, that D&K are suggesting that we judge the failure of NHA states in a 
different way to how we would judge the failure of human states. Svärd suggests ± with good 
reason ± that the authors have seemingly slipped into WKHNLQGRI³HFRORJLFDO´WKLQNLQJ that 
they initially rejected (Svärd 2013, p. 198), though I think an alternative reading is possible: 
D&K, I suggest, lean on a problematic account of necessity. In Zoopolis, predation (and, 
more generally, the likelihood of an early, violent, painful death) is framed as a part of what it 
means to exist as a sovereign member of a successful NHA state in a way that it is not framed 
as a part of what it means to exist as a sovereign member of a successful human (or mixed) 
state. It is only in this context that the authors can plausibly make sense of the claim that free-
living NHAs inflict violence upon each other out of necessity. I find the account 
unconvincing not least because NHAs do not make decisions on the basis of necessity; they 
have no conception of necessity. Instead ± and D&K accept this7 ± the extent to which 
violence, suffering and early death is part of their life is, in a very large way, down to 
humans: we are the beings with the power and, potentially, the will to do something to limit 
these things. If we choose to do nothing, then NHAs will continue to inflict violence upon 
each other, and so will continue to exist outside of the circumstances of justice (cf. Taylor 
2013, pp. 150-1). If we choose to do something, we can move NHAs into the circumstances 
of justice, or, at the very least, remove the thought of their violent relationships being 
³QHFHVVDU\´ What we do is a separate question; the current SRLQWLVWKDWWKH³QHFHVVLW\´RIWKH
violent relationships between NHAs dissolves once we begin to question the assumption that 
we should not be interfering. 
 
The failed state objection as an internal critique 
I have argued that D&K¶V UHVSRQVHV WR WKH)62DUHXQVXFFHVVIXOHowever, the FSO ± or, 
minimally, the claims in the present chapter ± can meaningfully be read as an internal 
critique of Zoopolis. If so, we can frame the problem like this: D&K¶VEDVLF LGHDV± about 
animal rights, citizenship, sovereignty ± are accepted (purely for the sake of dialogue, if 
necessary) but the way they are used is argued to be problematic. Specifically, the FSO 
suggests that the DXWKRUV¶application of sovereignty is a weak point in the argument. If the 
failed state objection is understood as an internal critique, there are two broad approaches that 
                                                          
7
 A power relationship with NHAs is inevitable; the question is the nature of the power relation. We need, they 
VD\³WRJHWDZD\ IURP WKH IDQWDV\ WKDWZHFDQDYRLGH[HUWLQJSRZHURYHUDQLPDOV´ 'RQDOGVRQDG.\POLFND
2013c, p. 770). 
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we could take; though I can only speak for myself, I suspect that this is where Horta and I 
would diverge. 
First, we could say ± with, I suspect, Horta ± that D&K have failed to provide a 
compelling argument against day-to-day intervention. Thus, the practical upshot of the 
sovereignty model would be day-to-day intervention, but a day-to-day intervention respectful 
of the interests that sovereignty was instituted to protect. Day-to-day intervention need not be 
fundamentally incompatible with respectful relationships with NHAs. We already accept that 
intervention in human states ± even quite wide-scale intervention ± can be done in a way 
respectful of, and compatible with, the interests humans have in sovereignty.8 The same kind 
of thing is true of NHA states. When we are permitted/obliged to intervene, D&K say, we 
VKRXOGLQWHUYHQHLQDZD\UHVSHFWIXORIWKHVRYHUHLJQW\DQG³GLJQLW\´9 of the community and 
its members. For example, we should not simply use intervention as a cover for furthering 
our own imperialistic interests (Donaldson, Kymlicka 2013d, pp. 180-2). Someone objecting 
to this model of day-to-day but respectful intervention might claim that switch from 
occasional, emergency intervention to day-to-day intervention would be sufficient to make 
the intervention disrespectful. However, this does not seem to be implied by what D&K 
actually say about the purpose of sovereignty ± that is, the reason they offer NHAs 
sovereignty, and the reason they think it will be beneficial: 
 
Our claim is that sovereignty rights²like indeed all rights²should be understood as 
protecting certain important interests against certain standard threats. In this case, 
sovereignty protects interests in maintaining valued forms of social organization tied 
to a particular territory against the threat of conquest, colonization, displacement and 
alien rule. This moral purpose, we argue, is equally applicable to humans and to wild 
animals. Indeed, animals arguably have even stronger interests in maintaining these 
territorially-specific modes of organization, since they are often more dependent on 
specific ecological niches. (2013a, pp. 151-2) 
 
This broad point is repeatedly made. In one place, D&K ZULWHWKDWWKHLUDFFRXQW³LQVLVWVWKDW
the moral purpose of sovereignty is to prevent injustices, in particular injustices of 
                                                          
8
 )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVLVVXHVHH/DXUHQ7UDF]\NRZVNL¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHSUHVHQWYROXPH 
9
 Donaldson and .\POLFND ZULWH IRU LQVWDQFH WKDW XQVROLFLWHG DVVLVWDQFH ³FDQ EH XQGHUWDNHQ LQ ZD\V WKDW
respect the dignity of those being assisted (including their right to be citizens of self-determining communities) 
RU ZD\V WKDW XQGHUPLQH WKHLU GLJQLW\´  SS 1-2). Dignity is a highly contested term in the human 
context, and perhaps even more so in the NHA context. I confess to being unclear on what Donaldson and 
Kymlicka here mean by it.  
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FRORQL]DWLRQ GHVSROLDWLRQ RU GRPLQDWLRQ´ (2015, pp. 340-1, emphasis D&K's). In another, 
WKH\ VWUHVV WKDW ³>Z@KHQ KXPDQV FRQTXHU FRORQL]H VHWWOH DQG GHYHORS >IUHH-living NHAV¶] 
territories, they harm free-living animals not only by killing them or reducing their food 
supply but also by denying them the right to maintain the ways of life they have developed in 
relaWLRQWR WKHLU WHUULWRU\´ WKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIVRYHUHLJQW\³ZRXOGVHUYHDVDSRZHUIXOFKHFN
RQWKLVLQMXVWLFH´(2013b, p. 215). 
Sovereignty, then, is a tool XVHG WR SURWHFW 1+$V¶ LQWHUHVWV LW LV QRW FODLPHG WKDW 
NHAs have an intrinsic interest in sovereignty in the way that human groups might.10 The 
question is whether day-to-day intervention could be compatible with the interests that 
sovereignty is deployed to protect. It does not seem impossible that it could be, though it 
would not be easy. Day-to-day aid for free-living NHAs could be structured so that it did not 
involve and was not a screen for conquest, colonization, domination, human settling or 
KXPDQ ³GHYHORSPHQW´. It could also be structured to avoid displacement of NHAs and 
disruption of NHA ways of life and their relationships with each other, except insofar as any 
displacement or disruption were necessary to protect NHAs from the kinds of harms that the 
intervention is meant to protect against.11 If there is nothing necessarily objectionable about 
day-to-day intervention in theory, the remaining issues would be practical: the pertinent 
questions would now be about how we can design wide-scale intervention strategies to be 
respectful, or about how we can safeguard against these interventions inadvertently (or, 
worse, through nefarious design) becoming schemes of settlement and colonization (and so 
on). Remaining theoretical questions might include the question of the extent to which we are 
obliged to intervene, rather than just being permitted to do so, and questions of priority. 
There is a second way to respond to the issue, and this would not require D&K to 
concede their (broadly) non-interventionist commitments. We could say that the sovereignty 
model does not preclude day-to-day intervention (that is, the FSO has merit), but that there is 
                                                          
10
 Ladwig observes that one of the purposes of sovereignty in human cases is to allow space and recognition of 
self-identity (2015, pp. 298-7). Collective self-identities, forged and protected through sovereignty, are plausibly 
important for humans in a way that they are not for NHAs. Similarly, though Donaldson and Kymlicka stress 
WKHLPSRUWDQFHRI1+$V¶UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK territory as an underpinning for sovereignty, territory is, plausibly, 
intrinsically important for humans while merely instrumentally important for NHAs, especially when considered 
through the question of sovereignty (cf. Cooke, forthcoming). Though NHAs need the right kind of habitat, it 
does not matter where this habitat is; a suitable habitat for a European hedgehog is suitable whether it is in 
Britain or Canada. The same is not true of humans; if an English person wants to live in her home country, she 
does not want to live somewhere indistinguishable from England, she wants to actually live in England. 
11
 Again, we could think about the treatment of free-living NHAs in contrast with the treatment of domesticated 
NHAs; according to Donaldson and Kymlicka, we must influence and adjust the ways of life of domesticated 
NHAs so that they are respectful to others, or at least live in a way compatible with respect of others. Donaldson 
and Kymlicka are right about this, and this means that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with exerting this 
kind of power and control over NHAs. That said, we do have good reason to be highly wary of it in the case of 
free-living NHAs. 
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nonetheless some other reason to oppose day-to-day intervention. Interestingly, D&K offer 
reasons to oppose intervention beyond the sovereignty arguments upon which they focus. 
Basically, they are of the view that any feasible intervention would involve the violation of 
the individual rights of NHAs. So, for example, they claim: 
 
We could only prevent predation by (a) forcibly separating all predator and prey 
species and then confining each to an allotted space; (b) forcibly preventing prey 
species from reproducing (since without predation their numbers would outstrip 
resources), which could only be done by separating males and females or sterilization 
(or infanticide); (c) finding alternative nutrition for predators; (d) controlling for all 
the knock-on effects of predation (feeding scavengers and so on). In short, we could 
only prevent predation by turning nature into a zoo, and by violating fundamental 
rights to mobility, association, and bodily integrity. (2015, pp. 338-9; cf. Donaldson, 
Kymlicka 2013b, pp. 216-7) 
 
We therefore have good reasons, if the authors are right, to object to intervention even if the 
FSO holds.12 
The focus on the violation of individual 1+$V¶ ULJKWVZKHQZH LQWHUYHQHFRXOGEH
supplemented with consideration about the nature of rights. Elsewhere (2015), I defend and 
GHYHORS 7RP 5HJDQ¶V FODVVLF UHVSRQVH WR WKH so-called ³predator problem´: that predatory 
NHAs, as moral patients but not moral agents, are incapable of violating rights, even though 
they can possess them (Regan 2004, p. 285).13 Specifically, I ± in that paper ± suggest that we 
should take account of the fact that moral agency is a matter of degree. For example, if a 
mouse is killed by a wildcat, no agent is responsible, and if a mouse is killed by a human 
agent, that agent is responsible. However, if the mouse is killed by the cat companion of a 
human agent, it seHPV WKDW WKHFDW¶VJXDUGLDQ LV responsible to a degree. As such, although 
NHAs in nature may suffer and may inflict great violence upon each other, it is not 
necessarily the case that their rights are violated ± to put it another way, not all death and 
                                                          
12
 I do note, however, that this particular reply is most relevant to intervention with the aim of protecting prey 
from predators, and not the kind of interventions, such as medical aid, upon which many pro-intervention 
theorists focus. 
13
 A moral agent is a being able to understand the rightness or wrongness of their actions, and so a being who 
can wrong someone as well as (presumably) be wronged. A moral patient is unable to understand the rightness 
or wrongness of their actions, and so cannot wrong anyone, but they are nonetheless someone to whom we owe 
certain duties. A newborn baby is an example of a moral patient; a baby cannot wrong someone else, but she can 
surely be wronged. 
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suffering which is equally bad is equally wrong. Thus, suffering in nature does not trigger a 
duty of intervention in the way that some other actions might, simply because there is no 
violation of negative rights involved.14 
It is possible that suffering in nature could trigger a duty of assistance insofar as free-
living NHAs have a positive right to assistance. Even if they do possess such a right, 
however, we would have to intervene in a manner that did not violate the negative rights of 
free-living NHAs. FRU H[DPSOH LW ZRXOG QRW EH DFFHSWDEOH WR UHVSHFW D GHHU¶V (putative) 
positive right to assistance by shooting dead a wolf; even if the deer has a right to our 
assistance when she is seriously threatened, the wolf has a right not to be shot, and so this 
immediately precludes us from using that as a means to aid the deer. When it comes to 
understanding these potential positive rights, we can return to the citizen/denizen/sovereign 
divide ± though the negative rights of different NHAs may be more or less the same, the 
different kinds of relationship we have with different groups of NHAs suggests different 
kinds of positive rights in each case. In some ways, this is the starting point of Zoopolis.15 
Thus, for example, while D&K SURYRFDWLYHO\KROGWKDW1+$FLWL]HQVKDYHDSRVLWLYH³ULJKWWR
communal resources and the social bases of well-being, such as PHGLFDO FDUH´ 2013d, p. 
142), the authors do not suggest that this same right is possessed by free-living NHAs. 
Thus, it is my claim that D&K¶VDSSURDFKwould be improved by greater attention to 
questions of moral agency. 6RPHRQH FRXOG UHVSRQG WR WKH DXWKRUV¶ use of the rights of 
individual NHAs (that is, not sovereignty as such) to reject day-to-day intervention by saying 
that protecting the very important negative rights possessed by prey against death and 
suffering could surely justify the limitation of SUHGDWRUV¶ ULJKWs to mobility. But once we 
recognise that the violent deaths of NHAs in nature are typically not wrongfully inflicted 
deaths ± they do not involve (negative) rights violations ± this disappears. The positive rights 
to assistance of free-living NHAs (to be explicit, D&K presumably hold that these are quite 
minimal positive rights, at least when compared with the positive rights of co-citizens) are 
much less likely to be able to outweigh the negative rights of individual predatory NHAs. As 
such, we would have good principled reason to reject interference with NHA-on-NHA 
violence (or at least the necessity of such intervention) in states other than our own (such as 
³VWDWHV´ RYHU ZKLFK 1+$V DUH VRYHUHLJQ ZKLOH UHWDLQLQJ D UHDVRQ WR LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKH
                                                          
14
 A negative right is a right not be treated in a certain way, while a positive right is a right to a certain kind of 
assistance. Paradigm negative rights include rights against murder, assault and theft, while paradigm positive 
rights include rights to healthcare, social security and assistance when under threat. 
15
 An alternative approach of this sort is offered by Clare Palmer (2010). The opposite view is defended by 
Alasdair Cochrane (2013). 
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predatory activities of humans in other states ± in the latter case, there is the violation of 
fundamental negative rights, while, in the former, there is not.16 Importantly, this holds even 
if we understand these states as failed, meaning that the possibility of (some forms of) 
intervention has been disentangled from questions about sovereignty. 
It is worth mentioning that a nuanced account of the significance of moral agency 
could even be useful in getting to grips with other aspects of Zoopolis; for instance, it could 
be helpful in explaining why we have a duty to protect denizen NHAs from our companions 
while we do not have a duty to protect them from each other. D&K hold that humans have a 
duty to socialise NHA citizens so that they are respectful towards denizen NHAs (2013d, pp. 
123-6). Nowhere, however, do they suggest that we have similar duties to socialise denizens. 
This suggests that a squirrel living in a city park is not the victim of injustice if killed by an 
urban fox in the same way as if she is killed by an under-supervised dog companion. 
Importantly, though, it would surely not matter whether this was the under-supervised 
companion of a human citizen or human denizen, or, indeed, whether a squirrel was killed by 
a human citizen or a human denizen; in all cases, the squirrel is surely the victim of an 
injustice. This means that the citizen/denizen distinction presumably cannot do the work here 
that it is required to do. However, if we were to supplement '	.¶V model with an account of 
moral agency, we could make sense of the injustice that the squirrel faces when killed by a 
human or a dog companion (citizens or denizens) but not by an urban fox (a denizen). 
These two answers to the failed state objection as an internal critique of sovereignty 
are not even incompatible with each other ± it is possible that they offer insight on different 
kinds of intervention. So, the first approach ± supporting day-to-day intervention ± might be a 
useful way of thinking about obligations to provide free-livinJ 1+$ ³FRPPXQLWLHV´ ZLWK
some level of food and medical aid. Whether this is true would depend on precisely which 
positive rights are possessed by free-living NHAs (a question outside the scope of this 
chapter). Meanwhile, the second approach ± rejecting day-to-day intervention for reasons 
other than sovereignty ± might be helpful in understanding why we are not obliged to protect 
NHAs from each other. 
                                                          
16
 Does this commit me to saying that we have no reason to interfere in, for example, infant-on-infant violence? 
In all but the most contrived of scenarios, it does not, for at least three reasons. First, though infants cannot 
violate rights, it is entirely possible that some agent has violated rights in the circumstances, analogous to how a 
FDW¶VJXDUGLDQLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHULJKWV-violations the cat inflicts upon mice. Second, infants, as members of 
RXUFRPPXQLW\DQGRXUIDPLOLHVKDYHSDUWLFXODUO\VWURQJFODLPVWRSRVLWLYHULJKWV7KLUGHYHQLILQIDQW¶VULJKWV
are in the offing, there may be other reasons to intervene. Rights are not the whole of morality, and the special 
relationships agents have with infants ground particularly strong (moral) obligations. These considerations 
surely apply to some NHAs (our companions, for example) but generally not to free-living NHAs. 
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Sovereignty, property and the real world 
We have seen that sovereignty theory is, for D&K, a tool to be deployed to protect certain 
fundamental NHA interests. When we understand the proposal in this sense, it is easy to see 
parallels with another recent proposal concerning free-OLYLQJ 1+$V QDPHO\ ³DQLPDO
property rights WKHRU\´ +DGOH\  -RKQ +DGOH\ Sroposes that, due to the important 
interests free-living NHAs have in access to their habitats and use of the natural resources 
contained therein, we should conceive of them having (something like) property rights. 
Namely, animal property rights theory sugJHVWV WKDW ZH VKRXOG FRQVLGHU WKH ³WHUULWRU\´ RI
NHAs as their property. However, +DGOH\ DOORZV WKDW 1+$V¶ SURSHUW\ PD\ EH
geographically coextensive with the property of humans, and so instead of simply saying that 
humans are not permitted to make use of 1+$ SURSHUW\ +DGOH\ VXJJHVWV WKDW 1+$V¶
LPSRUWDQWLQWHUHVWLQXVLQJWKH³QDWXUDOJRRGV´RIWKHLUWHUULWRU\EHSURWHFWHGE\DV\VWHPRI
guardianship. Appointed guardians, Hadley says, could speak on behalf of NHAs with a 
property right, allowing the possibility of the use/development of land in a way that is 
respectful to resident NHAs (2015, chap. 2). 
Despite mutual criticism (Donaldson, Kymlicka 2013d, pp. 160-1; Hadley 2015, pp. 
85-93), I suggest that D&K on the one hand and Hadley on the other are, in an important 
sense, fundamentally in agreement. Both parties recognise that NHAs have key interests in 
IUHHGRPIURPFHUWDLQNLQGVRIKXPDQLQWHUIHUHQFHDQGERWKWLHWKLVFORVHO\ZLWKWKHVH1+$V¶
use of land/territory. Both deploy tools from liberal theory (and real-world political practice) 
to protect these NHA interests. If we look at the debate this way, their disagreement seems to 
be pragmatic; there is simply a disagreement about which tool will be most effective when it 
comes to protecting NHA interests, rather than a dispute about what interests NHAs have or 
whether we should be paying attention to them.17 I do not intend to come down on one side or 
the other, but I do note that the two are a long way from incompatible. Steve Cooke 
(forthcoming) offers his own account of NHA property and sovereignty such that NHAs are 
                                                          
17
 This is one way of thinking about broadening political tools and concepts to protect/include NHAs ± first, we 
ask what interests NHAs have, and, second, we ask what tools we have that could effectively protect them. We 
could also think about it in the other direction by beginning with tools and using them to ask about interests. For 
example, it would be odd indeed to support handing out ballot papers to NHAs, but we could meaningfully ask 
if there is any interest possessed by NHAs that, in a human context, is protected by the right to vote. As such, 
ZHFRXOGWDONRI³YRWHV´IRU1+$V± in an academic or activist context ± EHFDXVHZHWKLQNWKDW1+$V¶SROLWLFDO
actions are meaningful and warrant attention. Donaldson and Kymlicka talk about the idea of NHA citizens 
being politically active (2013d, pp. 112-116), and other theorists have produced sophisticated and compelling 
work in this area (e.g., Driessen 2014, Meijer 2013). Hadley seems to be an interest-first thinker, while 
Donaldson and Kymlicka seem to use both approaches. 
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considered property-bearers with a right to secede if their property rights are not respected. 
Another way to bring together the theories might be found in thinking through D&K¶V
³XWRSLDQ´(Milligan 2015) style when contrastHGZLWK+DGOH\¶VVWURQJSUDJPDWLVP3HUKDSV
the dispute disappears if we think of Hadley as presenting a non-ideal theory of territory 
rights and D&K as offering an ideal theory.18 
Regardless of the lens through which this is considered, animal property theory 
seems, pro tanto, WREHWKHHDVLHUPRUHSUDFWLFDO³ILUVW´VWHSZKHQLWFRPHVWRSURWHFWLQJWKH
interests NHAs possess in their territory. Animal sovereignty theory, the critic may observe, 
seems to be logically subsequent to the application of basic negative rights to NHAs; even if 
they may present novel and compelling ways to move beyond basic negative rights, D&K 
clearly begin with them.19 This, the critic might continue, gives us another compelling reason 
to favour animal property rights as a practical solution to the question of how we should 
currently protect free-OLYLQJ 1+$V ³/RJLFDOO\´ +DGOH\ WHOOV XV ³DQLPDO SURSHUW\ ULJKWV
WKHRU\ LV VLOHQWDERXWZKHWKHU DQLPDOVKDYHXQLYHUVDO ULJKWV´ DQGKH LVRSHQ WR
justifying animal property rights without any reference to the interests of NHAs (2015, 104-
9). This suggests that we can introduce animal property rights theory to our current 
political/legal infrastructures without having to first introduce animal rights more broadly, 
and this is clearly something that Hadley wishes to endorse. Consequently, it may appear to 
be an excellent first step on the road to protecting the interests possessed by free-living 
NHAs. 
I do not find this argument convincing. This is because animal property rights theory 
without animal rights more broadly invites serious problems; namely, a kind of ³repugnant 
conclusion´.20 If NHAs have a right to access their land and enjoy the natural resources 
contained therein ± the essence of animal property rights theory ± but no right not to be killed 
E\KXPDQVWKHQLWIROORZVWKDWKXPDQVZLVKLQJWRHQFURDFKXSRQWKH1+$V¶ODQGFDQVimply 
kill them. The human guardian/advocate tasked with protecting the property claims of the 
NHAs living in a particular area will find herself on the losing side of the argument once it 
turns out that there are no NHAs left whose claims she defends. The conclusion is made more 
                                                          
18
 The non-ideal/ideal theory distinction is familiar but contentious in liberal political philosophy. I am inclined 
to think that the difference comes down to the kind of questions that are being asked; nonideal theorists ask what 
we can do to deal with a particular injustice, while ideal theorists attempt to sketch a picture of how the best 
possible state would deal with an issue. 
19
 Robert GDUQHUGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRWKLVSDUWRI'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFND¶VDSSURDFKVXJJHVWLQJWKDW³WKHFDVH
IRUUHJDUGLQJWKHLUDSSURDFKDVJHQXLQHO\GLIIHUHQWDQGLQQRYDWLYHFDQEHFKDOOHQJHG´ p. 102). 
20
 Although I borrow the term from Derek Parfit (1987), my use of it here is not related to his. For a discussion 
RI3DUILW¶VUHSXJQDQWFRQFOXVLRQLQDQLPDOHWKLFVVHH9LãDN. 
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repugnant when ZHUHDOLVH WKDWDQDUJXPHQWFRXOGEHFRQVWUXFWHGHQWDLOLQJ WKDW WKH1+$V¶
advocate should support the mass-slaughter of her charges. Let me explain: the advocate 
GHIHQGLQJWKHSURSHUW\FODLPVRI1+$V¶LVWDVNHGZLWKHQVXULQJWKDW1+$V¶SURSHUW\ULJKWV
are not violated. While she could diligently and articulately defend the interests of the NHAs 
E\FKDOOHQJLQJ WKHSODQVRIKXPDQV WKDW WKUHDWHQ WKH1+$V¶ LQWHUHVWV LQ WKHLUSURSHUW\VKH
could instead do what she can to ensure that all of her charges are killed, because, once they 
are killed, their property rights cannot be violated. In practice, she could do this by ensuring 
that the land is developed but on the explicit condition that all of the NHAs who have a 
property right in this land are killed. After all, assuming that NHAs have a right to property 
but no right not be killed, better they are killed as soon as possible to ensure that their 
property rights are not violated. This is a modification of a more familiar argument against 
the claim that it is bad for NHAs to suffer but not bad for them to be killed. If this were so, it 
ZRXOGVXUHO\IROORZWKDWLWLV³EHVW´WRNLOONHAs as quickly as possible so that they do not 
suffer at all.21 The idea that we might kill NHAs as quickly as possible so that they do not 
suffer/cannot have their property rights violated, in my view, entirely subverts the idea of 
animal rights. This gives us reason to doubt the claim that we do not wrong NHAs when we 
kill them, and reason question any animal rights system that GRHVQRWSURWHFW1+$V¶ULJKWQRW
to be killed.22 
The two elements of this repugnant conclusion, I think, show us that we are making 
some kind of mistake in attempting to deploy animal property rights theory without some 
kind of broader animal rights theory (by which I mean a politico-ethical framework genuinely 
respectful of NHAs ± LWQHHGQRWEHD³ULJKWV´WKHRU\VWULFWO\VSHDNLQJ). Any theory that says 
that human developers can fulfil their duties to free-living NHAs by killing them or says that 
we should as a matter of course protect NHAs by killing them appears to be importantly 
incomplete. As such, whatever the merits of animal property rights theory, it seems, like 
sovereignty theory, that it must be based upon a broader account of animal rights. 
This leaves us in a difficult position when it comes to asking about what we can do 
today, here and now, in institutional terms to protect free-living NHAs¶LQWHUHVWV in freedom 
from human domination and interference. Seemingly, the two theories here presented are 
both predicated upon ideas that are not, in practice, accepted. This leads me to my ultimate 
                                                          
21
 This argument was made (Godlovitch 1971) in Animals, Men and Morals, a book that helped push animal 
ethics into mainstream philosophy. Compare the work of Christopher Belshaw (2016), who is willing to bite the 
bullet and concede that, often, death will be a good thing for NHAs.  
22
 , GUDZ DWWHQWLRQ WR WKLV SX]]OLQJ DVSHFW RI +DGOH\¶V DFFRXQW LQ P\ UHYLHZ IRUWKFRPLQJ of his Animal 
Property Rights. I do not think it damning of his arguments, but I do think it a genuine problem. 
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conclusion: before we can seriously commit to protecting the interests of free-living NHAs in 
the systematic ways envisioned by sovereignty theory and animal property rights theory, we 
have to work towards changing the way NHAs are perceived and treated more generally. The 
negative consequence of this is that we must dismantle the myths of human exceptionalism, 
of the incommensurabO\ KLJK ³YDOXH´ DQG ³GLJQLW\´ RI KXPDQV DQG KXPDQ LQWHUHVWV ZKHQ
contrasted with NHAs and NHA interests, and of the moral relevance of species membership. 
The positive consequences of this are that we should be reframing the way that we (as 
individuals, societies, academic disciplines) think about NHAs and the issues that concern 
them. On a very practical level, this means adopting vegan lifestyles, and encouraging those 
around us to do the same. It means doing what we can as political agents to discourage and 
block policies and proposals that will adversely affect NHAs, from decisions about 
environmental policy to laws around animal testing to decisions about subsidies. It means 
changing the way we talk about and refer to NHAs. 
This approach represents the immediate practical and realistic changes that we should 
make if we are interested in protecting free-living NHAs through the introduction of large-
scale institutional measures;23 we are not, yet, in a position where we can realistically expect 
the introduction of institutions like D&K¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ WKHRU\RU+DGOH\¶VDQLPal property 
rights theory ± or at least not versions of them that we could expect to effectively protect the 
very interests that motivate their introduction. While most continue to disregard the interests 
of NHAs, these kinds of institutional interventions will fail to accumulate the necessary 
support for implementation. Even if this barrier could be overcome, the policies would be 
unlikely to be accepted in good faith, meaning that people would be motivated to disregard or 
circumvent the protections when it was in their interests to do so. Given that both systems 
rely upon humans to speak on behalf of NHAs ± whether this is in property-related mediation 
or representation in the international arena24 ± this worry is particularly acute. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In OLQH ZLWK RQH RI WKLV ERRN¶V FHQWUDO WKHPHV ± intervention in nature ± I have critically 
assessed a major proposal for understanding the appropriate level of human involvement in 
the lives of free-living NHAs; namely, D&K¶VSURSRVDOWKDWIUHH-OLYLQJ1+$³FRPPXQLWLHV´
                                                          
23
 I have, I note, remained quiet on the topic of small-scale, individual interventions. My focus has explicitly 
been on politics, not morality. 
24
 Donaldson and Kymlicka acknowledge in passing (2013d, pp. 208-9) that their system requires advocates to 
speak on behalf of sovereign NHA communities as an example of an issue yet to be explored as much as it 
should be. The point is more clearly developed by Cooke (forthcoming). 
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EH FRQFHLYHG DV VRYHUHLJQ /HDGLQJ RQ IURP WKLV DQG LQ OLQH ZLWK DQRWKHU RI WKLV ERRN¶V
central themes ± the question of how we should respond to the problems of NHA suffering 
and mistreatment in the real world ± I have asked if we should support the establishment of 
WKHLQVWLWXWLRQRI1+$VRYHUHLJQW\WKH³ULYDO´LQVWLWXWLRQof animal property rights, both, or 
neither. In the first part of the chapter, I concluded that D&K have not successfully responded 
to the FSO, but that this is not catastrophic for their project. Indeed, once we appreciate the 
significance of moral agency when it comes to questions of intervention, we are nonetheless 
able to support many of the practical consequences of the sovereignty account without 
needing to deny that 1+$ ³FRPPXQLWLHV´ DUH VRPHZKDW DQDORJRXV WR IDLOHG VWDWHV ,Q WKH
latter part of this chapter, however, I suggested that both sovereignty theory and animal 
property rights theory are (or should be) predicated upon a more basic account of animal 
rights, and that this more basic account is a long way from contemporary practice. As such, it 
is appropriate that we target our efforts at moving towards this more basic account before we 
expend too much capital pursuing these kinds of systematic protections of NHA territory. 
This means, most simply, adopting and encouraging veganism, and, somewhat less simply, 
inculcating and developing more respectful modes of thought about NHAs. 
It may seem curious that I finish a chapter on intervention in nature with the fairly 
typical call for veganism and more respectful attitudes towards NHAs, but this should not be 
read as condemnation of the thinkers expending time pursuing a greater understanding of our 
obligations towards free-living NHAs. Without doubt, all good work in this area will 
contribute to more thoughtful and respectful ways of thinking about NHAs and their interests. 
Further, the work has considerable value in its own right by helping us come to terms with 
what an ideal (or ³PRUHideal´) institutional relationship with free-living NHAs will look like. 
My worry is simply that, while we continue to live in societies that disregard the interests of 
NHAs so completely, these proposals will have limited applicability in the world as it 
actually is. When the societies in which we live come closer to offering NHAs the respect 
they deserve, we will have a multitude of carefully worked-out proposals ready for 
deployment. Importantly, though, the intellectual seeds being sown today need to find a more 
fertile ground on which to grow; if we long for practical change in this area, our first step has 
to be coming together to create that fertile ground. 
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